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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On February 14, 2000, the Fourth Judicial District Court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. [R. 196, 190]. On February 29,
2000, Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal. [R. 217]. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2A-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court properly awarded defendant alimony even though he failed
to consider the plaintiflPs ability to pay, the defendant's ability to provide her own living
expenses, or the parties' standard of living during the marriage. The trial court's factual
findings should be reversed as clearly erroneous "if the findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence oyr if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. C.A, 385 UAR 93 f20 (Ut. Ct. App.
1999). See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Ut. Ct App. 1991). The trial court's
alimony award based on these findings will be reversed if it is an abuse of discretion.
Howell, supra, 806 P.2d at 1211.
Whether the trial court factual findings supporting its alimony award were
sufficient without specific or subsidiary findings on the plaintiffs ability to pay, the
defendant's ability to provide her own living expenses, or the parties' standard of living
during the marriage. The sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings are reviewed
under a correction of error standard. Anderson v. Doms, 984 P.2d 392, 39619 (Ut. Ct.
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App. 1999).
Whether the trial court properly awarded defendant her attorney's fees without
properly considering the plaintiffs ability to pay or the defendant's ability to pay her
own attorney fees. The trial court's factual findings should be reversed as clearly
erroneous "if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence fir if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v.
C.A., 385 UAR 93 ^20 (Ut. Gt. App. 1999). See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211
(Ut. Ct App. 1991). The trial court's attorney's fee award based on thesefindingswill
be reversed if it is an abuse of discretion. Howell, supra, 806 P.2d at 121L
Whether the trial court factual findings supporting its attorney's fees award were
sufficient without specific or subsidiaryfindingson the plaintiffs ability to pay or the
defendant's ability to pay her own attorney's fees. The sufficiency of the trial court's
factual findings are reviewed under a correction of error standard. Anderson v. Doms,
984 P.2d 392, 396 p (Ut. Ct. App. 1999).
Whether the trial court properly awarded defendant plaintiffs truck and whether
the trial court's findings on this issue were adequate. The trial court will be reversed if it
is an abuse of discretion. Howell, supra, 806 P.2d at 1211. The sufficiency of the trial
court's factual findings are reviewed under a correction of error standard. Anderson v.
Doms, 984 P.2d 392, 396 %9 (Ut Ct. App. 1999).

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5.
Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children
- Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and
visitation - Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for
modification.
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
$ $ $ $ $

(c)

(d)

pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i)

an order specifying which party is responsible for the
payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;

(ii)

an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations,
or liabilities and regarding the parties1 separate, current
addresses; and

(iii)

provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and

provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
$ $ $ $ $

(7)

(a)

The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
the length of the marriage;
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(v)

whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or
operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spousefs skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage.

(b)

The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.

(c)

As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in
accordance with Subsection (7)(a). However, the court shall consider
all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the
standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.

(d)

The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize
the parties' respective standards of living.

(e)

When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing
the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.

(f)

In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage,
the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which
existed at the time of the marriage.

(g)

(i)

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable
4
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at the time of the divorce.
(ii)

The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at
the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.

(iii)

In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
Subsection (7).

*
(h)

(A)

The court may consider the subsequent spouse's
financial ability to share living expenses.

(B)

The court may consider the income of a subsequent
spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper

* . ;•*.*>

conduct justifies that consideration.

Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.

(8)

Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.

(9)

Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This is a divorce action in which the parties had very few assets, except for a

5
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marital home, and modest incomes during the marriage. The primary issue was how to
divide these modest assets and income to support two households. Resolution of this
issue was made more difficult by the defendant's voluntary unemployment following the
parties' separation.
A trial was held to address alimony, property division, and custody/child support.
The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which found, among
other things, that defendant was voluntarily unemployed. [R. 187]. The trial court
further found that the equity in the marital home was $73,000, that each party was
entitled to one-half the equity, but that Plaintiff could not obtain his share of the equity
until the children moved out or Defendant cohabitated. [R. 189-88],
In addition to awarding defendant the marital home and delaying plaintiff''s receipt
of his equity, the trial court entered judgment against plaintiff for alimony in the amount
of $600.00 per month and for defendant's attorney's fees. [R. 186]. The alimony and
attorney's fees award contains no finding on plaintiff's ability to pay alimony even
though his income was less than his expenses plus child support. Without explanation
the trial court awarded alimony and attorney's fees that the undisputed evidence showed
plaintiff could not pay.
Plaintiff has filed this appeal to challenge the trial court's determination with
respect to alimony, the attorney's fee award and the property division.

B.

Statement of Facts*
Plaintiff Charles Deloy McKenzie ("Deloy") and defendant Kathy McKenzie
6
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("Kathy") were married for 11 years. [R. 190 ]. They have two children, Cassie born
January 8, 1989, and Sierra, born April 19, 1992.
The primary marital asset was the marital home. [R. 189, 186]. The trial court
found that the equity in the home was $73,000. [R. 189]. The trial court awarded the
home to Kathy and delayed distribution of the equity until the youngest of the children
leave home or the mother cohabitates. [R. 189-88].
Prior to the separation, both parties worked. [Tr. 17-19]. Deloy is currently
employed as a truck driver and earns approximately $12.00 per hour. [Tr. 60]. Kathy is
currently voluntarily unemployed and has been since the parties' separation. [R. 187].
Kathy offered no evidence as to her living expenses.
Deloy's net income after taxes was between $1,500 and $1,700 a month. His
living expenses, as shown on Exhibit 5, not including child support or alimony, were
approximately $1,396 per month. Thus, his net income after taxes and living expenses
but before child support and alimony was between $104 and $304 a month. In addition,
Deloy had other debts exceeding $2,400. [Tr. 37-44, 70-79, Ex. 5, 9, 10].
Using the child support guidelines, the trial court awarded Kathy child support in
the amount of $464 per month. [R. 185 ]. Including this child support obligation as an
expense used all of Deloy's net income and placed him in a negative or deficit position of
between $160 and $360 for each month.
Although payment of child support put Deloy in a negative position each month,
the trial court increased Deloy's deficit by also awarding Kathy alimony in the amount
7
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of $600/month plus attorney's fees. [R. 187-86]. The deficit including alimony but not
Kathy's attorney's fees was between $760 and $960 for each month. The trial court
however provided no explanation of how Deloy could pay this amount given the
undisputed facts concerning his income, expenses, and deficit position each month.
Moreover, the trial court did not consider Kathy's voluntary unemployment or expenses
in assessing her need for such payments.
The Court's property division exacerbated the unfairness of the alimony and
attorney fees award. While the trial court found $73,000 in equity, it refused to direct
sale of the home to permit Deloy to benefit from the equity. Instead, the trial court
awarded the home to Kathy until the children were grown or she cohabitated. [R. 18889]. Deloy was thus denied the use of his equity which Kathy in essence can use while
Deloy also pays alimony.

"

Finally, the trial court inexplicably awarded Deloy's truck to Kathy. Both parties'
testimony was that Deloy owned a 1978 Ford truck at the time of the separation. This
was his only means of transportation. In Kathy's proposed Findings of Fact, the 1978
Ford truck was awarded to Deloy with an appropriate credit against his portion of the
equity in the house. [R. 74]. ^
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This divorce action was tried on the issues of alimony, property division, and
attorney's fees. Appellant Deloy McKenzie has challenged the court's ruling on each of
these issues. For the most part his challenges go to the lack of any evidence supporting
8
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the trial court's ultimate conclusions. Appellant's arguments are summarized as follows:
It is axiomatic that an alimony award must consider the parties' standard of living
during the marriage and must also consider the recipient's need for alimony and the
payor's ability to pay. However, in the instant case, no evidence was submitted
concerning the parties' standard of living during the marriage or on the recipient spouse's
ability to provide her own needs. Moreover, the trial court ignored the undisputed
evidence that Deloy did not have the ability to pay the alimony awarded. Based upon this
record, the trial court could not properly award alimony.
The award of alimony is also deficient because it is not supported by sufficient
findings. Stated simply, the trial court did not make sufficient findings with respect to
the parties' standard of living, Kathy's ability to pay or Deloy's ability to pay. For this
additional reason, the alimony award should be reversed.
An award of attorney's fees in a divorce action is driven by many of the same
factors as are relevant to an alimony award. There must be evidence of the payor
spouse's ability to pay as well as the recipient spouse's need for such payment. In this
case, there is no evidence concerning Kathy's ability to pay her attorney's fees.
Moreover, the undisputed evidence is that Deloy does not have the resources to make
such payments. Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court had no basis for
entering an award of attorney's fees and failed to make sufficient factual findings on
these critical elements.
The trial court's property division is equally defective. For unknown reasons, the
9
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trial court awarded Deloy's truck to Kathy. Kathy's own proposed Findings of Fact
however, recognized that the truck should be awarded to Deloy. Given these facts, the
court's award is without factual basis and is not supported by sufficient findings.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
1$ AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Alimony or spousal support is intended to provide support for the receiving spouse

sufficient to maintain her or him, "as nearly as possible at the standard of living she [or
he] enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the [spouse] from becoming a public
charge." Willey v. Willey, 866 P. 2d 547, 550 (Ut. Ct App. 1993) (quoting Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985)). In awarding alimony, the trial court must
consider whether the obligor spouse has the ability, given his income and expenses, to
provide support. Id at 550-51 &ft.1. The trial court must also consider whether the
recipient spouse has the earning capacity to satisfy her own reasonable needs and
expenses. Id "Failure to consider [these] factors in fashioning an alimony award
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id Additionally, the trial court's factual findings on
these factors will be reversed as clearly erroneous "if the findings . . . are against the clear
weight of the evidence QT if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. C.A, 385 UAR 93, f 20 (Ut. Ct. App.
1999). See also Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) ("Findings of
fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review
10
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)

In the instant case, the trial court's alimony award does not satisfy these minimum
requirements. The trial court's findings on alimony are either unsupported by any facts
or contrary to the undisputed facts. Moreover, any fair reading of the record shows that
the award is a mistake if the trial court had only considered Deloy's undisputed, inability
to pay the amount awarded. As a result, this Court must reverse the trial court's ruling
awarding alimony as clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
Each of these defects in the alimony award provide an independent, separate
grounds for reversing the trial court's award of alimony. Each of these defects in
addressed in turn in the discussion that follows.
A.

No Evidence Supports a Finding That Kathy's Current Living Standard
is Less Than She Enjoyed During the Marriage,

Alimony is intended to provide the recipient spouse with the standard of living that
she had during the marriage. Willey, supra, 866 P. 2d at 550. In different words,
alimony is not appropriate where the parties' standard of living following the divorce is
the same as it was during the marriage. See Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241,
242-243 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (Alimony properly terminated where recipient spouse's
standard of living was equal to the standard of living during marriage). Without evidence
of the standard of living during the marriage, the trial court could not properly award
alimony. See, Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686, 689 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). ("The
needs of the spouses are determined by looking at the standard of living the parties
established during marriage.")
11
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This Court's observation in Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Ut. App. 1990) also
applies to the instant case:
Here, the parties have approximately equal, if low, standards of living,
which is not a substantial deviation from the "low, minimum" standard of
living which the parties experienced during the marriage. "This is simply
one of those all-too-frequent situations where the court was confronted with
the impossible task of attempting to cut one blanket to cover two beds and
satisfy both parties when the truth of the matter is that they cannot afford a
divorce, but must have one anyway.
Id at 121. Like in Munns nothing in the record suggests that Kathy's standard of living
is significantly different from Deloy's nor that it is below the standard of living that the
parties shared during their marriage.
;

The record contains no evidence of the parties' standard of living during the

marriage. This absence of evidence made it impossible for the trial court to find that the
award of alimony was necessary to maintain Kathy in the standard of living that she had
during the marriage.
It is telling that the trial court made no factual finding about the standard of living
during the marriage. If he had made such a finding, the finding would have been clearly
erroneous given the absence of any evidence on that issue. State v. C.A., supra, 385
UAR 93 f20. Moreover, without evidence on the standard of living, the trial court's
award of alimony is an abuse of discretion. Wiley, supra, 866 P.2d at 550. For these
reasons alone, the Court should reverse the alimony award.1
1

Since the trial court made no factual finding on this issue, Deloy has no
obligation to marshal the evidence with respect to this finding. Williamson v. Williamson,
12
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B,

Deloy Does Not Have the Financial Ability to Pay Alimony,

A critical consideration in awarding alimony in this case is Deloy's ability to pay.
Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51. Deloy submitted the only evidence concerning his
income and expenses. No one disputed that Deloy's expenses, as evidenced by Exhibit 5,
were modest and reasonable. [Tr. 37-44, 70-79, Ex. 5, 9, 10]. In fact, these expenses
unrealistically understated housing expenses, because Deloy has lived in his truck or a
motel following the separation. [Tr. 68-70].
This undisputed evidence shows that Deloy's income is not sufficient to pay his
monthly expenses plus child support. His total monthly expenses, not including child
support or alimony, are $1,396 per month. [Tr. 37-44, 70-79, Ex. 5, 9, 10]. When child
support of $464 is added to this amount, his total expenses are $1,860 per month. Given
that Deloy's monthly net income after taxes is between $1,500 and $1,700 per month [Tr.
37-44, 70-79, Ex. 5, 9, 10]. Deloy does not have sufficient funds to pay his legitimate
expenses and child support, much less an additional $600 a month for alimony. In fact
his monthly deficit after alimony is between $760 and $960 a month. This deficit would
becomes even greater in light of the trial court's decision to require Deloy to pay Kathy's
attorneys fees.
This Court has made clear the importance of the payor's income and expenses in
determining whether to award alimony. Specifically, the Court recognized that the trial

983 P.2d 1103, 1105 f8 ft. 2 (Ut. Ct. App, 1999).
13
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court must determine the payor spouse's living expenses to determine the payor's spouses
ability to provide support. Wiley, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51 (A factual determination on
payor spouse's financial need "is required for an assessment of the third Jones factor, the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support.") Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]hefindingsshould also address [payor's] needs and expenditures,
such as housing, payment of debts, and other living expenses.")
The payor's financial condition including his income and expenses is important for
two reasons. First, an alimony award could not be sustained if, through no fault of his
own, the payor spouse did not have the money to pay support. Second, "[a]n alimony
award should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living
standards." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Ut. Ct App. 1991) Obviously, this
equalization or balancing cannot occur without fair consideration of the payor's spouse's
income and expenses. See Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51 (f,[W]ithout a finding on
reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true needs of Wife, or to determine
Husband's actual ability to pay and, therefore, to balance Wife's needs against Husband's
ability to pay as required in Jones,")
Although Deloy's ability to pay alimony is a critical factor, the trial court made no
specific finding that Deloy had the ability to pay the amount awarded or any amount, and
made no finding on his income and expenses. If the trial court had found that Deloy had
the ability to pay alimony, such finding would be clearly erroneous given the undisputed
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evidence that his income and expenses left him in a deficit position each month.2 State v.
C.A., supra, 385 UAR 93 120. In addition, an award of alimony without proper

'•*

consideration of Deloy's ability to pay is an abuse of discretion. Wiley, supra, 866 P.2d
at 550-51. For these reasons alone, the Court should reverse the trial court's award of
alimony.
C.

Kathy Has Not Established Her Inability to Provide for Her Own
Reasonable Needs,
1.

A finding that Kathy cannot provide for her own reasonable
needs would be clearly erroneous.

Even if Deloy had the ability to pay child support, which he does not, Kathy
would not be entitled to an award of alimony unless she established her own inability to
provide for her reasonable needs. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1994) (The recipient spouse's need for payment to cover her expenses constitutes
"the maximum permissible alimony award" regardless of payor spouse's ability to pay.)
Such proof would require evidence not only of her ability to earn income, but also of her
reasonable expenses. As discussed below, the evidence, or lack of evidence, on Kathy's
financial need precludes an award of alimony.
In analyzing Kathy's ability to provide for her own needs, the first consideration is
her income-making ability. With respect to this factor, the trial court below properly

2

Since the trial court made no factual finding on this issue, Deloy has no
obligation to marshal the evidence with respect to this finding. Williamson v. Williamson,
983 P.2d 1103, 1105 1f8 ft. 2 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999).
15
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rejected Kathy's disability claims. The trial court found that she was voluntarily
unemployed, and that it was appropriate to impute to her income at minimum wage for an
amount of $892.00 a month. [R. 187]. Neither Kathy nor the State have challenged these
factual findings in this appeal. See Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 123234 (Ut.vCt. App. 1995) (refusing to consider issues raised in untimely cross appeal).
This imputed income was not Kathy's only source of support during the
separation. She also received $521 per month in child support, and $435 per month in
assistance. [Tr. 35-36, 133. R. 36]. Kathy presented no evidence of how this money was
used, what the state assistance was for, or what portion of the money was spent for her
personal expenses and what portion for the children's expenses.
Having established an income level, the trial court should then have assessed the
amount and reasonableness of Kathy 's living expenses. Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 55051. The trial court however had no evidence with which to assess this issue because
Kathy offered no evidence itemizing or quantifying her living expenses, nor suggesting
that the expenses were reasonable. In fact, she did not offer any evidence of her total
expenses for any month. It is thus impossible to determine what her reasonable needs
were or whether her income was sufficient to satisfy her reasonable needs. It is also
impossible to determine whether these expenses were expenses for the children properly
covered by the $521 per month of child support.
The trial court made no findings on the amount or reasonableness of Kathy's
living expenses. Such finding would be clearly erroneous given the absence of any
16
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evidence on that issue. State v. C.A., supra, 385 UAR 93 f20. Moreover, an award of
alimony without such a finding would be an abuse of discretion. Wiley, supra, 866 P.2d
at 550.
Kathy's ability to provide for her own needs is related to the parties' standard of
living during the marriage. The trial court could only award alimony reasonably
necessary to maintain Kathy in the standard of living that existed during the marriage.
Kathy has not only failed to prove her reasonable expenses but she has failed to prove the
standard of living during the marriage. See Part I (discussing proof of parties's standard
of living during marriage). Given this failure of proof, the trial court could not award
alimony.

r

2.

•;

Marshaling does not provide support for a finding that Kathy
cannot provide for her own needs.

In recognition of his marshaling obligation, Deloy's counsel has reviewed the
record for evidence supporting a finding that Kathy did not have the ability to provide for
her own reasonable needs. Two items of evidence could be relevant to such a finding.
However, as discussed below, they are insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion
that Kathy could not provide for her own needs.
The first of these is Kathy's sale of a vehicle to pay family expenses and loans
from family members. [Tr. 131-133, 142-143, 150-152, 162-165, 167-169, 170]. The
trial court relied upon the sale of the vehicle as evidence that Kathy needed the support
for herself and her children. [R. 186]. The trial court, however, failed to take into

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

account that when the vehicle was sold, Kathy was voluntarily unemployed and could
have been earning as much as $829.00 a month. The loans similarly occurred while she
was voluntarily unemployed. The sale and the loans, therefore, do not support the
conclusion that she did not have the ability to support herself if she chose to work
Moreover, the sale of the vehicle to pay expenses does not establish, nor is it relevant to
the issue of whether the expenses claimed were reasonable.
The sale and loans also have little bearing on Kathy's current ability to provide
her own current needs. In large measure, the sale proceeds and loans were use to pay
pre-separation debts. [Tr. 131-133, 150-152, 162-165, 167-169, 170]. It is not possible to
tell how Kathy actually used the money to pay current expenses. The loan and sale thus
are not sufficient to establish Kathy5 s financial need.
The other evidence of Kathy's ability to pay concerns her receipt of public
assistance. The evidence shows that she was receiving aid from the state. [Tr. 133]. The
record, however, is devoid of any explanation of why she is receiving this money. It is
simply not clear whether this award of money is based upon her need or because of the
children. She however has applied for but not received social security disability. [Tr.
165]. The trial court's finding that the assistance was based on "her unemployed status
andfinancialneeds" is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by any evidence. [R.
36].
In light of the foregoing, the court's finding concerning Kathy's need for alimony
and her ability to pay her reasonable expenses is clearly erroneous.
18
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D.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Awarding Kathy Alimony
and the Home and by Delaying Deloy's Receipt of His Equity,

The propriety of an award of alimony must be considered in light of the award of
the marital home to Kathy. The award of the marital home prevents Deloy from
obtaining any benefit from his $36,500 in equity. Implicit in this ruling is a finding that
Kathy and her children would be benefitted from letting them remain in the home. This
type of support alleviates the need for alimony. See, Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 876 P.2d
870, 874-75 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing relation of award of marital home to spousal
support and children's welfare and noting reduction in alimony for rental value of house).
Viewing the award of the marital home as a form of support exposes the patent
unfairness of the trial court's alimony award. Kathy, without cost to her, gets the benefit
of Deloy's substantial equity in the home. She also gets alimony and recovers her
attorney's fees. Deloy, on the other hand, must delay getting his equity and must pay
alimony and her attorney's fees, even though he does not have enough income to pay his
own living expenses and child support. Given these facts, the award of alimony and
attorney's fees is an abuse of discretion.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO ALIMONY ARE
INADEQUATE.
A trial court's findings supporting an alimony award must include findings on all

material issues. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). This Court
will reverse findings that fail to provide "sufficient subsidiary findings to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id. Findings
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on alimony are insufficient it they "do not specifically set forth [the recipient's] financial
condition and need for support, including her earning capacity, or [the payor's] income
and ability to pay." Id. In the instant case, the trial court's findings with respect to
alimony are wholly inadequate.
The trial court's findings contain no findings with respect to critical issues such as
the parties' standard of living during the marriage. Additionally, with respect to other
factors, the trial court provides no subsidiary findings to show the steps by which it
reached its ultimate conclusion. The absence of subsidiary findings is particularly
troubling given the undisputed evidence controverting the ultimate conclusion.
A.

Trial Cowl Macfc No Finding on Standard of Livipg During Marriage

Although the purpose of alimony is to provide the recipient spouse with the
standard of living during the marriage, the trial court in the instant case made no finding
as to what the standard of living was during the marriage. Since no evidence was offered
on this issue, the trial court had no basis for awarding alimony. See Part LA. above.
Alternatively, however, its failure to make a finding on this factor means the findings are
inadequate and provides additional grounds for reversing the alimony ruling.

B.

Trial Coml Made Np Finding or Subsidiary Findings on Dgloy's Ability
to Pay Alimony,

As discussed above, the undisputed facts establish that Deloy's income was
insufficient to cover his expenses plus child support. See Part LB. above. In the face of
this undisputed evidence, the trial court made no specific finding that Deloy had the
20
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ability to pay the alimony. The trial court simply referred to Deloy's income, but made
no subsidiary findings supporting the conclusion that he had the income to pay the
alimony.3 The trial court's findings were therefore inadequate and the alimony award
should be reversed. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P. 2d 841, 843 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992)
(Trial court "must do more than simply state that 'the defendant has the ability to pay.'")
C.

Trial Court Made No Subsidiary Findings On Kathy's Ability to Pay
Her Living Expenses.

The trial court did make a specific factual finding related to Kathy's need for
support. The trial courtfindingsstate:
23.

The Court finds that the Defendant is in need of temporary spousal support
in light of the Plaintiff's present income, Plaintiff's ability to earn income,
Defendant's ability to earn income as a minimum wage earner.

24.

The Defendant's need for support is in part evidenced by the fact that she
had to sell a vehicle in order to obtain additional monies to live on to
support herself and the children....

This factual finding, however, is not supported by any subsidiary findings. It is thus
impossible to tell from the trial court's ruling how the court concluded, based on the
evidence, that Kathy lacked the ability to provide for her own financial needs or to
maintain herself in the standard of living that she had during the marriage. Since the trial
court's findings are inadequate on this factor, the decision awarding alimony should be

3

The trial court's only reference to Deloy's ability to pay is found in the
Findings at Paragraph 23 which states in pertinent part: "The Court finds that the
Defendant is in need of temporary spousal support in light of the Plaintiff s present
incomej Plaintiffs ability to earn income...." [R. 186].
21
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reversed
HI.

AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS INAPPROPRIATE GIVEN THE
PARTIES' RESPECTIVE FINANCIAL CONDITION,
Before a trial court can award attorney's fees, it must find (1) that the requesting

party is in need of financial assistance and (2) that the other spouse has the ability to pay.
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).4 These factors are virtually
identical to the factors considered in awarding alimony. Similar to thefindingsrequired
for an alimony award, the trial court must make specific findings on the recipient's
financial need and the payor's ability to pay. Id. at 741-42.
Applying these standards to the instant case, this Court must reverse the trial
court's award of attorneys fees. Deloy does not have the ability to pay such fees,
particularly given his debts for his own attorney and for his own medical expenses. See
discussion at Part LB. above. Similarly', Kathy failed to prove her need for an award of
attorneys fees. See discussion at Part I.C. above. Finally, the trial court's findings do
not adequately address either Kathy5s or Deloy's ability to pay. See discussion at Part II
above. For the reasons discussed above, the trial court's award of attorney's fees is
clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.

4

A third factor is the reasonableness of the requested fees. Muir, supra, 841
P.2d at 741. Kathy however never requested the trial court to enter judgment on the
amount of fees.
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IV.

DELOY'S 1978 FORD TRUCK SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO
HIM.
The trial court's division of real and personal property recognizes that Deloy's half

of the home equity is $36,500. Although this value is awarded to him, he cannot receive
any payment of this amount until Kathy remarries or cohabitates. Stated simply, he has
no money on which to start anew.
In addition to awarding to marital home to Kathy, the trial court awarded the 1978
Ford truck to her as well. This 1978 Ford truck has been Deloy's since its purchase and
was awarded to him as part of Kathy's proposed Findings of Fact. [R. 74]. Given the
generous award of the residence and the delay in recovering of his equity, the trial court
should award him the 1978 Ford truck, his only means of transportation. Any other
award, without appropriate subsidiaryfindings,is an abuse of discretion and should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should reverse the trial court's award
of alimony and attorney fees. The award is contrary to the undisputed fact that Deloy
does not have the ability to pay alimony and is not supported by any evidence that Kathy
has a need for such support. Alternatively the award of alimony and attorney fees should
be reversed because the trial court did not make appropriate findings on all material
issues and failed to make sufficient subsidiary findings.
This Court should also reverse the award of Deloy's truck to Kathy. Kathy
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conceded in her findings that the truck should be awarded to Deloy. The trial court's
award of the truck to Kathy is thus without factual support and is not supported by
sufficient findings.
Dated this-K^ day of August, 2000.

^^foseph ¥. Dunbeck, Jr
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES DELOY MCKENZIE,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs
KATHY MCKENZIE,
Defendant.

CASE NO. 97440041
DATE: 8/2/99
JUDGE: GARY D STOTT
CLERK: SLW

RULING

This matter came before the Court for trial on June 18, 1999. The parties were present
and represented by counsel. Based upon the evidence presented, the Court hereby enters the
following memorandum decision:
1. Jurisdictional Facts and Grounds for Divorce:

Plaintiff and defendant are bona

fide and actual residents of Wasatch County, State of Utah and have been for more than three
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. Plaintiff and defendant are
husband and wife, having been married on March 1, 1989, in Reno, Nevada. There are
irreconcilable differences between the parties, making continuance of the marriage impossible.
More than 90 days have elapsed since the filing the complaint in this action and the parties have
completed the educational course for divorcing parents as shown by their certificates offered into
evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2. Custody and Visitation:

Two children have been born to this marriage; Kassie,

born January 8, 1989, and Sierra, born April 19, 1992. Defendant has been the primary physical
care provider for the children, with the children being in her custody since the parties' separation
in February 1997. In deciding the issue of custody, the Court has considered evidence submitted
by the parties with respect to their individual abilities to presently provide for the children a
reasonable and appropriate place to live and to provided the necessities of life. The evidence in
the case established that plaintiff is a truck driver, driving long haul and local, which frequently
, takes him out of the state of Utah for many days a month. From Mr. McKenzie's own testimony,
he presently lives out of his truck or in a motel.
The children need an established environment where they can receive the care and
nurturing necessary for their development. The children are ages ten and seven. Therefore, the
Court finds the best interest and welfare of the children can be met by awarding to the mother
primary custody of the children, subject to visitation by the father, pursuant to the statutory
guidelines as provided in § 30-3 UCA.
The custodial parent shall notify the non-custodial parent within 24 hours of receiving
notice of all significant school, social, sports and community functions which the children are
participating in or being honored, and the non-custodial parent shall be entitled to attend and
participate fully with the children. Furthermore the custodial parent will immediately notify the
non-custodial parent of any medical treatment provided to the children. The plaintiff shall be
awarded the dependent child deduction for tax purposes for both children since the mother
currently has no income and would not benefit from the deduction.

3. Alimony and Child Support:

For the purpose of determining child support and

alimony, based upon the evidence provided, the Court believes it is appropriate to impute income
to the defendant as a minimum wage recipient.

2
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The Court finds that Mrs. McKenzie i? voluntarily unemployed. She has testified that she suffers
from a medical condition identified as fibro myalgia and sleep disorder. She indicated that her
condition is debilitating to the point that she is unable to hold a full time job because of extreme
difficulty in dealing with stress and pressure associated with work. Because of her condition, she
is presently receiving assistance from the State and other individuals and entities.
However, there was no evidence received by the Court from Respondent's treating
physicians which established that Mrs. McKenzie cannot work due to her present physical or
emotional condition. Evidence was received which indicates Mrs. McKenzie is presently under
the care of a physician addressing her medical needs.
Evidence has established that Plaintiffs income as a truck driver averages $2400.00 per
month. That figure is arrived at based upon the testimony provided and the evidence found in
Exhibit's six, nine, and ten. The plaintiffs income of $2400.00 per month and the minimum wage
of the defendant as imputed to her are to be used by counsel to calculate the statutory amount of
child support. Considering Plaintiffs present income, plaintiffs ability to earn income, ability of
the Defendant to produce income as a minimum wage earner, it is the Court's opinion that the
Defendant is in need of temporary spousal support. In fact, the Court notes that since the time of
separation the Defendant has had to sell a vehicle in order to obtain additional monies to live on to
support herself and the children.

The Court also notes that the parties were married on March 1,

1988. They were separated in February of 1997. As a result of the shortness of the marriage, the
evidence recited above and the factors referred herein with respect to issue of alimony, it is the
Court's opinion that Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant for alimony the sum of $600 per month for
two years beginning August 1, 1999. In deciding the issue of alimony the Court must make
findings and conclusions with respect to the following factors: a) the financial condition and needs
of the party seeking alimony, b) the ability of the payer/spouse to provide support, and the ability
of the receiving spouse to produce income, and © the length of the marriage. (See § 30-3-5 UCA;
Chambers v Chambers 840 P.2nd, 841 (UCT. App. 1992). The general purpose of alimony is to
prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a probate charge and to maintain to the extent
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
3
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4. Real Property Division: Defendant and the children have been living in the home
which was purchased by the parties during the course of their marriage. From the evidence
received at trial it was difficult for the Court to determine the actual value of the home.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the parties owe approximately $52,000 on the home. The
Court concludes that the present value of the home is $125,000. Deducting the $52,000
mortgage, the equity in the home is established as of the time of trial to be $73,000. Each party is
entitled to one-half of that sum which equals $36,500. From the testimony provided, the Court
believes it is reasonable that Defendant be awarded the home subject to the indebtedness. Should
^

Defendant remarry or cohabitate, then in such event, whichever shall occur first, she shall either

\f

sell the home or refinance it and pay to Plaintiff his equity as established herein less any amounts
to be deducted as set forth in this opinion. Such sum shall be paid within ninety days of the
remarriage or cohabitation.
5. Personal Property Division: From the evidence provided the Court finds that the
parties brought into the marriage^items of personal property. Some of those items of personal
property were subsequently sold and the funds used to provide for the support of the family.
Therefore the Court finds that such funds were co-mingled for family use. Any items of personal
or real property purchased by such funds then constituted marital property. The Court finds that
during the course of the marriage each of the parties used money of the parties for the purpose of
paying debts or obligations which were incurred prior to the marriage. In as much as the payment
of such obligations was by way of agreement between the parties, no offsets or credits for such
payments will be allowed. The parties are mutually responsible for any debts or obligations
incurred since the time of the separation in February 1997. Furthermore each party shall be
awarded any asset acquired by them after the time of separation and will remain that parties' sole
and separate property.
h \
1

The parties acquired various items of personal property during the course of their
marriage. Plaintiff is awarded the following items: (a) the items of personal property listed on
plaintiffs Exhibit 12. If those items are still in the residence of the defendant they shall be made
available to the plaintiff within 30 days of the date of this ruling. Plaintiff is also given the Oceana
Trailer. Plaintiff is also given the 1989 Yamaha Blaster 4-W. Plaintiff is awarded the tool chest
and tools. The Court finds that subsequent to the Court's temporary order for the payment of
4
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spousal support in this case the plaintiff sold the two wave runners and trailer for $3500 without
accounting to the defendant for such funds. Defendant is entitled to Vi of the $3500 which
plaintiff received in the sale of the wave runners and trailer. The amount shall be deducted from
his equity interest in the home. The following items of personal property will be awarded to
Defendant: the 1978 Ford truck, and all of the household furniture and furnishings shall remain in
the home with the defendant and the minor children, except those items listed in plaintiffs exhibit
12. The defendant shall be given the 1985 Yamaha 4-w and the trampoline.
The Court finds that after the separation of the parties, the defendant was in possession of
a 1985 Dodge Diplomat. By reason of her inability to meet the financial needs of the family, the
defendant was forced to sell the automobile, using the money to pay the family obligations and to
support her and the children. Therefore, the Court is not going to provide credit to Plaintiff for
his claimed share of such proceeds.
6. Medical and Dental Insurance: In respect to medical and dental insurance for the
children and the payment of medical expenses for the children not covered by insurance, the Court
orders that the plaintiff shall be required to maintain insurance coverage for medical expenses for
the benefit of the minor children until they reach age 18. Both parities shall share equally any
uninsured medical expenses incurred for the minor children. Furthermore, the parent who incurs
medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to
the other parent within 30 days of payment. The parent incurring medical expenses may be denied
the right to receive credit for the expense or to recover the other parent's share of the expense if
the parent fails to provide to the other parent written verification of the cost of the payment of
such expenses as stated above.
7. Attorney's Fees: The evidence provided clearly indicates that the plaintiff is
employed and does receive monthly compensation as a result of his employment. The evidence
also indicates that the defendant is unemployed and has been unemployed for approximately two
years. The evidence also indicates that the defendant is receiving public assistance by reason of
her unemployed status and financial needs. In light of the parties' individual financial conditions,
the Court finds that the plaintiff shall pay the reasonable attorney's fee incurred by the defendant
in defending her claim. Such fees and costs may be established by counsel for the defendant filing
an affidavit setting forth the claimed attorney's fees and costs.
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Counsel for the plaintiff shall prepare appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and
decree and submit the same to counsel for defendant for signature approved as to form. Such
findings and decree shall be consistent with the rulings made in this memorandum decision.

DATED: August 2, 1999

G\V4AL

GaryD. Stoi
District Coukludge

^**

^ //v
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I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing RULING were mailed, postSfe^prepaid, on
August 3, 1999 to the following parties:
Ruth Wagner, 860 Westwood Road, Park City UT 84098
Benjamin Davis, Hand Delivered
Joseph Dunbeck, 55 West Center Street, Heber City UT 84032
V

Deputy Court Clerk
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Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES DELOY McKENZEE,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.

)

KATHY McKENZEE

)
)
)

Defendant.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civil No. 974400041
Judge

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and
accompanying memorandum. Neither Defendant nor Intervener filed a response to Plaintiffs
motion. Based upon the motion, the evidence submitted at trial, and for good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Dated this ^ ^ d a y of October, 1999.
By the Court:

1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (t? day of October, 1999, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration to:
Ruth Wagner
860 Westwood Road
Park City, Utah 84098
Benjamin Davis
Assistant Attorney General
150 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
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houni'i Judicial District Coun
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr., #3645
123 S Main Street,//I
P.O. Box 947
Heber City, UT 84032
Telephone. 435-654-7122
Facsimile: 435-654-7163

Jr-:12-.:.9il~-. .Oepuiy

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY

CHARLES DELOY McKENZIE
)
]>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)I

Civil No. 974400041

KATHY McKENZIE

]1

Judge Gary D. Stott

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

]

This matter came before the Court for trial on June 18, 1999. Plaintiff Charles Deloy
McKenzie appeared in person and was represented by Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. Defendant Kathy
McKenzie appeared in person and was represented by Ruth Wagner. Based upon the evidence
presented, the Court hereby makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
L

Jurisdictional Facts & Grounds for Divorce.
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide and actual residents of Wasatch County,

State of Utah, and have been for more than (3) months immediately prior to the commencement
of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband having been married on March 1,
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1989, in Reno, Nevada
3.

There are irreconcilable differences between the Plaintiff and Defendant making

the continuation of the marriage impossible.
4.

More than ninety days have passed since the filing of the complaint in this action

and the parties have completed the educational course for divorcing parents as evidenced by the
certificates offered into evidence.
IL

Findings Related to Children of this Marriage.
5.

Pursuant to Rule 4-901(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the

Plaintiff and Defendant state, upon information and belief, that there are no proceedings for
custody of the above-named minor childrenfiledor pending in the Juvenile Court.
6.

Utah is the home State of said minor children pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45c-3(l)(a)

7.

The Plaintiff and Defendant do not know of any person, not a party to these

(1953).

proceedings who has physical custody of the subject minor children and who claims to have
custody or visitation rights with respect to said children.
III.

Real Property Division,
8.

During the marriage the parties acquired a marital home.

9.

The present value of the marital home is $125,000.

10.

The mortgage on the marital home is approximately $52,000.

11.

The equity in the home is $73,000 of which each party is entitled to $36,500 or

one half of the equity.
12.

The Defendant should be awarded the possession of the marital home until such
•
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time as she (a) remarries, (b) cohabitates or (c) the youngest of the parties' children reaches the
age of 18 or graduates from high school during the child's normal and expected year of
graduation, whichever occurs first.
13.

Upon the occurrence of the events referred to in the immediately preceding

paragraph, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff his equity less any amounts deducted as set forth in
these findings of fact and conclusions of law. Such payment will be made within 90 days of the
triggering event.
IV,

Custody and Visitation.
14.

Defendant has been the primary physical provider for the children, with the

children being in her custody since the parties' separation in February 1997.
15.

In deciding the issue of custody, the Court considered evidence submitted by both

parties with respect to their individual abilities to presently provide a reasonable and appropriate
place for the children to live and to provide them with the necessities of life.
16.

The evidence in the case establish that Plaintiff is a truck driver, driving long haul

and local, and is frequently out of the state of Utah for many days a month. From his own
testimony, he indicates that he presently lives out of his truck or in a motel.
17.

The children need an established environment where they can receive the care and

nurturing necessary for their development.
18.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the best interests and welfare of the

children require that the mother be awarded primary custody of the children, subject to visitation
by the father, pursuant to the statutory guidelines in Section 30-3-32, 33, 34, 35. Copies of these
statutory provisions are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3
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19.

The parties are specifically directed to comply with the provisions of Section 30-

3-33 of the Utah Code Annotated. In particular, the custodial parent shall:
a.

Notify the non-custodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all

significant school, social, sports and community functions which the children are
participating in or being honored, and the non-custodial parent shall be entitled to attend
and participate fully with the children.
b.

The custodial parent will immediately notify the non-custodial parent of

any medical treatment provided to the children.
c.

The court awards to the Plaintiff the dependent child deduction for tax

purposes for both children because the mother currently has no income and would not
benefit from the deduction.
V.

Child Support.
20.

For the purposes of determining child support, the Court finds that it is

appropriate to impute income to Defendant at minimum wage. The Court finds that Defendant is
voluntarily unemployed. She complains of certain medical conditions, but presented no evidence
from her treating physician establishing that she cannot work due to her present physical
condition. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that she is voluntarily unemployed and that
income should be imputed to her at minimum wage.
21.

For the purposes of determining child support, Plaintiffs gross monthly income as

a truck driver averages $2,400 per month. This finding is based upon the testimony provided and
the evidence found in Exhibits 6, 9, and 10. Using these gross income amounts, and applying the
Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Child Support Act guidelines, the Defendant's share of the child
4
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support is $464.00 a month
VI.

Alimony.
22.

For the purposes of determining alimony, the Court finds that the Defendant is

voluntarily unemployed and that she should be treated as a minimum wage earner. This finding is
supported by the evidence referred to in paragraph 20 above.
23.

The Court finds that the Defendant is in need of temporary spousal support in

light of the Plaintiffs present income, Plaintiffs ability to earn income, Defendant's ability to earn
income as a minimum wage earner.
24.

The Defendant's need for support is in part evidenced by the fact that she had to

sell a vehicle in order to obtain additional monies to live on to support herself and the children.
Because of the relative shortness of the marriage, and the factors described hereinabove, the
Court finds that Plaintiff should pay Defendant $600 per month for two years beginning on
August 1, 1999, as alimony.
25.

In resolving the alimony issue, the Court has considered that the general purpose

of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a ward of the State and to permit her
to maintain, to the extent possible, the standard of living during the marriage. The factors the
Court considered in awarding alimony in this case included: (a) the financial condition and needs
of the party seeking alimony; (b) the ability of the payor/spouse to provide support, and the ability
of the receiving spouse to produce income and (c) the length of the marriage. See generally,
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 and Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Ut. App. 1992)
VII.

Personal Property Division.
26.

Both of the parties brought various items of personal property into the marriage.
5
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These items of personal property were subsequently sold and the proceeds were commingled and
used for family purposes. As a result, any items of personal real property purchased by such
funds should be treated as marital property and neither party should be entitled to a credit or debit
related to such premarital assets.
27.

With respect to assets acquired or debts incurred following the separation, each

party should be responsible for the debts that they incurred following the separation and shall be
awarded any assets that they acquired during that time period.
28.

Plaintiff is awarded the following items of personal property:
a.

The items of personal property listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 12. If those
items are still in the residence of the Defendant, they shall be made
available to Plaintiff within 30 days of the date of these findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

29.

b.

The Oceana trailer.

c.

1999 Yamaha Blaster 4-wheeler.

d.

Tool chest and tools.

Following the parties' separation, Plaintiff sold two wave runners and a trailer for

$3,500.00 without accounting to Defendant for such funds. Defendant is entitled to one-half of
the $3,500.00 which Plaintiff received from the sale of the wave runners and trailer. This amount
shall be deducted from his equity interest in the home.
30.

Defendant is awarded the following items of personal property:
a.

1978 Ford Truck.

b.

All household furniture and furnishings remaining in the home except those
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items listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.

31.

c.

1985 Yamaha 4-wheeler.

d.

Trampoline.

Following the parties' separation, Defendant sold the parties' 1995 Dodge

diplomat. She sold the vehicle because of thefinancialneeds of the family and used the money to
pay family obligations and to support herself and the children. As a result, the Courtfindsthat
Plaintiff is not entitled to a credit for his share of the proceedsfromthe sale of the Dodge
Diplomat.
VHL Medical and Dental Insurance.
32.

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain insurance coverage for medical expenses for the

benefit of the minor children until they reach the age of 18. Pursuant to 78-45-7.15, the parties
shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by Plaintiff for the
children's portion of the medical insurance.
33.

Both parents shall share equally any uninsured medical expenses incurred for the

minor children. The parent who incurred medical expenses shall provide written verification of
the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of the payment. The
parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parents share of the expenses if the parent fails to provide the other parent
written verification of the cost of the payment of such expenses.
IX.

Attorney's Fees.
34.

The Plaintiff is employed and receives monthly compensation as a result of his

employment.
7
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35.

Defendant is unemployed and has been unemployed for approximately two years

36.

Defendant is receiving public assistance by reason of her unemployed status and

financial needs.
37.

In light of the parties' individual financial conditions, the Court finds that Plaintiff

shall pay the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Defendant in defending her claim.
38.

Such fees may be established by counsel for the Defendant by filing an affidavit

setting forth the claimed attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
To the extent not stated or implicit in the foregoingfindingsof fact, the Court makes the
following conclusions of law.
1.

This court has jurisdiction over this divorce because the Plaintiff and Defendant are

bonafideand actual residents of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and have been for more than (3)
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

There are irreconcilable differences between the Plaintiff and Defendant making

the continuation of the marriage impossible. The parties are thus entitled to a decree of divorce
and an order restoring the wife to her maiden name.
3.

Based on the foregoing factual findings on the parties' marital and separate

property and debts, the Court finds that it is fair and equitable to divide the parties' personal
property as provided in paragraphs 26 through 31 of the Findings of Fact.
4.

Based on the foregoing factual findings on the parties' marital and separate

property and debts, the Court hereby awards the marital home to Defendant subject to the
restrictions in paragraphs 11 through 13 of the Findings of Fact.
8
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5.

Child support should be computed based on the husband's gross monthly income

of $2,400.00 and on the wife's income at minimum wage for a 40 hour week. Defendant is
awarded support in the amount of $464.00 per month. The child support obligations under the
divorce decree will commence upon entry of the decree.
6.

The husband shall be awarded the dependent child deduction for both children

since the wife currently has no income and would not benefit from the deduction. Utah Code Ami
§ 78-45-7.21(4) (An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will result in a
tax benefit to that parent).
7.

In setting alimony, the court must make findings and conclusions demonstrating

that it has considered three factors: (1) thefinancialcondition and needs of the party seeking
alimony; (2) that party's ability to produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the other
party to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); Chambers v. Chambers,
840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
8.

Under this standard, Defendant is entitled to $600/month for two years beginning

August 1, 1999.
9.

In determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and

the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The court may inquire
of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but
the expressed desires are not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody
otherwise. In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds
relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the
child frequent and continuing contact with the non-custodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
9
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Utah Code Ann. §30-5-10.

10.

Based on the factual findings and the applicable legal standard, the Court finds that

the mother should be given primary custody of the children subject to visitation by the husband
under the statutory guidelines as provided in Chapter 3, Title 30, of the Utah Code.
11.

Each party shall be awarded any asset acquired by them after the separation or any

asset in their possession and not specifically awarded as part of these findings.
12.

Each party shall be liable for and shall pay all debts and obligations that he or she

incurred after the parties' separation and shall indemnify and hold the other harmless from these
debts and obligations.
13.

Attorney fees may only be awarded based on "evidence of thefinancialneed of the

receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1998). In the instant case, Defendant is entitled to
an award of attorney's fees and costs.
14.

The Court finds that the ongoing child support and alimony awards ordered at the

trial of this matter shall commence in June, 1999.
15.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should make all payments to the Office of

Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011, unless the Office gives
notice t chat payment should be sent elsewhere.
Dated this/^day of \^Jo

, 1999.

By the Court:
/S/GARYD.STOTT
Judge Gary D. Stott
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY
CHARLES DELOY McKENZIE
Plaintiff,
vs.
KATHYMcKENZIE

DECREE OF DIVORCE

.

)
1
)
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Civil No. 974400041

]I

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendant.

Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Court hereby
adjudges, orders and decrees:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff and Defendant are granted a divorce, effective
immediately, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall return to her maiden name.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party is entitled to one half or $36,500 of the
equity in the marital home which is $73,000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be awarded possession of the marital
home until such time as she (a) remarries, (b) cohabitates or (c) the youngest of the parties'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

children reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school during the child's normal and
expected year of graduation, whichever occurs first.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the occurrence of the events referred to in the
immediately preceding paragraph, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff his equity in the amount of
$36,500.00. Such payment shall be made within 90 days of the triggering event.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the mother be awarded primary custody of the children,
subject to visitation by the father, pursuant to the statutory guidelines in Sections 30-3-32, 33, 34,
35, of the Utah Code. Copies of these statutory provisions are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties comply with the provisions of Section 30-333 of the Utah Code Annotated. In particular, but without limiting the foregoing, the custodial
parent shall:
a.

Notify the non-custodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all
significant school, social, sports and community functions which the
children are participating in or being honored, and the non-custodial parent
shall be entitled to attend and participate fully with the children.

b.

The custodial parent will immediately notify the non-custodial parent of
any medical treatment provided to the children.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs child support obligation is $464.00 a month.
The child support obligations under the divorce decree will commence in June, 1999.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay alimony to Defendant in the amount
of $600 per month for two years beginning on August 1, 1999.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that with respect to assets acquired or debts incurred
2
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following the separation, each party should be responsible for the debts that they incurred
following the separation and shall be awarded any assets that they acquired during that time
period.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded the following items of personal
property:
a.

The items of personal property listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 12. If those
items are still in the residence of the Defendant, they shall be made
available to Plaintiff within 30 days of the date of thesefindingsof fact and
conclusions of law.

b.

The Oceana trailer.

c.

1999 Yamaha Blaster 4-wheeler.

&

Tool chest and tools.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is entitled to one-half of the $3,500.00
which Plaintiff receivedfromthe sale of the wave runners and trailer. This amount shall be
deductedfromhis equity interest in the home.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is awarded the following items of personal
property:
a.

1978 Ford Truck.

b.

All household furniture and furnishings remaining in the home except those
items listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.

c.

1985 Yamaha 4-wheeler.

d.

Trampoline.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall maintain insurance coverage for medical
expenses for the benefit of the minor children until they reach the age of 18. Pursuant to 78-457.15, the parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by
Plaintiff for the children's portion of the medical insurance.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parents shall share equally any uninsured medical
expenses incurred for the minor children. The parent who incurred medical expenses shall provide
written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30
days of the payment. The parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive
credit for the expenses or to recover the other parents share of the expenses if the parent M s to
provide the other parent written verification of the cost of the payment of such expenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay the reasonable attorney's fees
incurred by the Defendant in defending her claim and that such fees may be established by counsel
for the Defendant byfilingan affidavit setting forth the claimed attorney's fees and costs.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded the dependent child deduction for
both children.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party is awarded any asset acquired by them after
the separation or any asset in their possession and not specifically awarded as part of the findings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall be liable for and shall pay all debts and
obligations that he or she incurred after the parties' separation and shall indemnify and hold the
other harmless from these debts and obligations.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ongoing child support and alimony awards ordered
at the trial of this matter shall commence in June, 1999.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall make all payments to the Office of
Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-001 I, unless the Office gives
notice that payment should be sent elsewhere.
Dated this (3-day of *-Hp

, 1999.

By the Court:
/S/GARYD.STOTT
Judge Gary D. Stott
Approved as to form:

Ruth Wagner

Benjamin Davis

Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.

Date

Date

Date
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correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Divorce Decree to:
Ruth Wagner
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Park City, Utah 84098
Benjamin Davis
Assistant Attorney General
150 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
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